The Design of a Best Execution Market by Budimir, Miroslav et al.
The Design of a Best Execution Market
Miroslav Budimir, Dipl.-Kfm.* {miroslav.budimir@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de}
Carsten V. Holtmann, Dipl.-Kfm.+ {carsten.holtmann@brokat.com}
Dirk G. Neumann, Dipl.-Oec., M. A.* {dirk.neumann @wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de}
* Information Systems, Justus-Liebig-University of Giessen, Germany
http://www-wi.wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de
+ Brokat AG, Financial Systems, Stuttgart, Germany
http://www.brokat.com






Phone +49 / 641 / 99 22 612
e-Mail: dirk.neumann @wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de
2Table of Contents
ABSTRACT                                                                                                                                             3
1.    THE MATRIX OF BEST EXECUTION                                                                                       5
1.1. BEST EXECUTION FACTORS 6
1.2. MARKET PARTICIPANTS AND BEST EXECUTION 7
1.3. PRODUCTS AND BEST EXECUTION 13
2.    THE DESIGN OF BEST EXECUTION MARKETS                                                                  13
2.1. TRADITIONAL MARKET MODELS 14
2.2. DYNAMIC MARKET MODELS AS A SOLUTION 16
3.    THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DYNAMIC MARKET MODEL                                         19
4.    CONCLUSION                                                                                                                               24
NOTES                                                                                                                                                   26
REFERENCES                                                                                                                                      29
FIGURES                                                                                                                                               33
3Abstract
The notion of best execution on securities markets is manifold. Best execution has different
meanings to different market participants, therefore, it is difficult to find a unique market
structure that meets this requirements for all the participants.
Traditional market structures are either static or flexible, meaning that an individual market
participant has no influence regarding the concrete market structure’s characteristics, like e. g.
the price discovery mechanism, trading frequency or the market transparency.
Focussing on customer orientation, we propose a new type of market structure: the dynamic
market model, where participants individually choose the characteristics of the market
structure for each transaction they perform. Furthermore, this paper offers an approach to
design dynamic market models from scratch. We briefly sketch the necessary steps towards a
dynamic market model.
Finally, we present AMTRAS; the prototype of an electronic trading system that was
conceived and implemented following the aforementioned approach. AMTRAS is an
software-agent based bond trading system designed for the need of institutional investors. It
implements a dynamic market model, a sophisticated product- and partner matching scheme
as well as an innovative price discovery approach.
4The Design of a Best Execution Market
The term best execution is used by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) since the 1970ies
(Levitt 1999) and most scientists in the field of finance do agree that the notion of best
execution does not attribute to one single factor, but its common use is in many cases
inconsistent and it often refers to “best price“ only.
In our opinion best execution depends on a wide variety of elements and has to be analyzed
from two different perspectives:
i. The investor’s perspective:
Each investor (respectively each group of investors with homogeneous demands) has her own
understanding of best execution depending on a huge number of possible demand or
execution factors like speed, price, market impact etc. The relevance of each single element’s
contribution to the goal of best execution thereby differs depending on the individual
demands of the investor regarding the product to be traded.
ii. The market’s design perspective:
Even though the discussion of best execution often targets the question of broker’s
responsibility to ensure execution quality for their clients (see Levitt 1999), we do follow
Macey and O’Hara taking a closer look upon the question of market design: “best execution
must be considered within the context of market structure“ (Macey and O’Hara 1997, p. 220).
Instead of defining best execution as a question of order routing, we consider it to be a
question of customer orientation in market design. As “each trading structure provides a
different vector of execution attributes and services a different clientele“(Macey and O’Hara
51997, p 220) designing one market structure that allows best execution for a number of
investors remains a question of high complexity and unseldom huge compromises.
insert figure 1 around here
This article deals with this circumstances and introduces the idea of dynamic market
structures as a concept to more customer orientation in the design of markets.
Figure 1 illustrates how market structures have to be designed regarding their structural
features (like transparency, price discovery etc.) to meet investor’s demands – represented in
special execution factors – to generate a best execution situation.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we will illustrate demand characteristics respectively
execution factors of different investor groups and the resulting complexity implied in the
design of markets in section one. The idea of dynamic market structures – the individual
configuration of the market’s structural features – will be presented in section two and
illustrated by a research prototype that was implemented as a proof of concept in chapter
three. The last chapter will outline some conclusive remarks and address future research of
transferring the aforementioned approaches to commodities markets as well.
1. The Matrix of Best Execution
Most scientists and practitioners in the field of finance agree that the notion of best execution
does not attribute to one single factor, like the execution price. Rather than that, it seems more
likely that best execution depends on a wide variety of elements. In this section we examine
some of these factors and show that their relevance differs with respect to different investor
groups: Best execution factors that are of major importance for a fund manager might not be
as relevant for an individual investor. Furthermore, the same is true for the diversity of traded
6assets: Best execution factors in stock trading clearly differ from best execution factors in
bond or derivatives markets.
In the following subsection we elaborate the best execution factors.
1.1. Best Execution Factors
Although the literature does not provide an encyclopedic list of factors, a few articles are
helpful to identify the most important ones. Wagner and Edwards (1993) keep their analysis
on cost arguments: They summarize all the factors within trading costs, that being liquidity
costs, transaction costs like commission, price impact, timing and opportunity cost. Other
authors, like Macey and O’Hara (1997, p. 189) address the timing of trades, the trading
mechanism, the commission and the trading strategy as relevant factors besides the execution
price. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 1977) identified following elements as
determinants for best execution: price, order size, the securities trading characteristics, the
availability of information affecting investors decisions and appropriate information
technology (IT) possibilities to process this information, access to different markets and the
costs and difficulty associated with achieving an execution. Similarly, NYSE’s recent Market
Structure Report (NYSE 2000, p. 14) identifies the execution price, the opportunity for price
improvement, the execution speed, the market impact of execution, the certainty and the cost
of execution as relevant attributes.
Though it is nearly impossible to list all the relevant best execution factors, the factors stated
above may limit the amount of all possible factors to what we think might be very important
ones. Since the aim of this paper is not the quest for the ultimate best execution factors-list,
we exemplarily pick some of them and show why they might be of importance for a particular
7market participant.
1.2. Market Participants and Best Execution
The concept of best execution can only be applied with consideration of the needs of different
market participants. Institutional investors have different needs than individual investors.
Traders have different requirements than securities dealers. But even within these groups
there is fragmentation regarding their requirements, e. g. depending on a specific situation.
For instance, institutional investors can be divided into following subcategories (each of to be
described below):




Banks trading for their own account can be divided into short- and long term traders,
respectively. Short term traders, especially speculators, try to benefit from price fluctuations
that appear intraday. They do not prefer to hold positions over a long period of time. Another
group of short termed players are arbitrageurs, they profit from price differences across
different markets. Both the speculators and arbitrageurs prefer access to different markets
combined with fast execution and low commissions. Long term institutional investors hold
relatively large positions for a longer time span, so that order size connected with an
appropriate trading mechanism might be of greater importance than e. g. the need for
immediate execution.
8Funds manage assets on behalf of their customers. Pension funds typically invest in low risk
stocks and bonds, whereas mutual funds cover a wide variety of investment possibilities,
ranging from conservative funds to high-risk growth funds containing, e. g. IT and biotech
stocks. Depending on the clientele and the kind of the managed securities the requirements
towards best execution are inhomogeneous: Some funds shift frequently from one security to
another, others do not. Therefore, the former require low commissions and a discriminating
trading strategy, whereas these factors do not play a major role for the latter.
Firms like insurance agencies or (multinational) corporations with appropriate cash
management systems might want to temporarily invest their excess liquidity in securities.
These investors are primarily interested in fast execution without any major or unexpected
difficulties, especially when liquidity is needed again in the core business.
Companies active on the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market, i. e. corporations intending
to acquire other firms in part or as whole through the equity market. These, so called takeover
operations may be either friendly or hostile, once again imposing different requirements
towards best execution: A friendly takeover might be just as simple like any block transaction
as seen on the upstairs market of the NYSE or – in major cases – so difficult that its
arrangement needs the subtle skills of investment bankers. However, a hostile attempt to
acquire the majority of a firm may even be more complex. Besides the consideration of order
impact, the attacking firm might need a trading strategy, which implies to remain anonymous
until the relevant disclosure obligations are accomplished.
National banks acting as fiscal agents with special tasks concerning government bonds or
foreign exchange issues. The Deutsche Bundesbank, e. g., has the obligation to perform
market-smoothing operations of exchange-traded Federal debt securities in order to ensure
9trading at all times, also in larger amounts, and at market prices (Deutsche Bundesbank 1995,
pp. 59-60). Furthermore, under certain conditions an intervention in the foreign exchange
market is possible. The Bundesbank’s goal is therefore not profit maximization but market
influence. So its requirements towards best execution is not primarily the price nor the
transaction costs but the speed of information dissemination about the market entry of the
major player.
Besides these, institutional investors, there are individual investors involved in the market
processes. Regarding the tremendous growth of online brokerage accounts, these investors
will have to be taken into account while designing tomorrows financial markets (see
Weinhardt and Gomber and Holtmann 2000, p. 826). They, too, have different needs
regarding best execution:
Funds investors bear the agency costs of the principal-agent relationship between them and
the funds manager. There are many conceivable sources for this cost: First, investors are
usually interested in low commissions, which can be attained by minimizing shifts between
stocks in the fund. The funds manager, on the other hand, is interested in frequent fund
restructuring in order to charge fees to his customer. Second, funds pool liquidity. That means
that a fund has large financial means to its manager’s disposal. This makes nearly every
transaction a block transaction with a corresponding price impact. An individual investor
wouldn’t face this impact if she retailed the corresponding stock herself. One possible way to
avoid such a market impact might be to convince the market that this block trade is liquidity
(i. e. not informational) motivated. Similarly to sunshine trading (Grossmann 1988), there
could be a chance to lower the price impact due to disclosing the trader’s (here the fund’s)
identity to the market, given a trader’s good reputation. One possible way to achieve this
might be to display the trader’s name in the open limit order book. In contrast to sunshine
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trading, this trade wouldn’t have to be announced some time span before – the decision of
identity disclosure is at a traders own behalf at the moment of order specification. This
possibility, however, requires an innovative market design; one that allows market
participants to individually decide upon their degree of anonymity in the trading process. The
same holds for institutional investors, e. g. for fiscal agents.
Increasing IT possibilities make new brokerage services possible. In those dark ages before
the merits of online brokerage, retail investors were at their brokers mercy: Every single order
had to pass the broker’s desk, relevant financial information – like up-to-date quotes, the
market situation or a trader’s order status – was only to be obtained through the broker.
Despite the broker’s obligation to best execute a customer’s order, there was neither a
guarantee about it nor a reliable or feasible monitoring possibility for the investor. All of that
changed with the advent of online brokerage: A contemporary online broker just routes the
customer’s order to any desired trading place. The whole process just takes seconds due to the
speed and reliability of the (competitive) online broker’s IT infrastructure. Now, it is at a
customer’s own responsibility to check the validity of her order and to monitor it’s status on
the market; furthermore the customer decides – based on her preferred execution factors –
where to trade her securities.
Due to the automation of the transaction processes,i transaction costs decrease dramatically,
especially in the retail market.ii Besides that, online brokers offer a wide variety of additional
services, like websites with extensive market information, chatrooms for investors etc. All of
these arguments contribute to customers clearly preferring online brokerage to conventional
brokerage. This observation is actually supported from a survey conducted by the Association
of German Banks: The number of online brokerage accounts doubles every year
(Bundesverband Deutscher Banken 1999). Despite all the advantages of online brokerage,
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there is still a significant number of customers who prefer traditional brokerage services.
There may be several causes for that, starting from the lack of either a computer with internet
access or the knowledge to operate one, the general reluctance to new technology (especially
computers) or even a physical handicap to utilize a computer, psychological barriers like fear
of committing mistakes of grave consequence while ordering a security online, up to the
simple preference to contact the broker personally.
Individual investors differ also regarding the amount of brokerage services. Especially online
brokerage customers vary extremely regarding trade frequency and volume (Abell 1998). For
instance ConSors, a major European online broker, defines star traders as customers with
more than 100 executed orders per year and a securities account volume of more than
50.000   	
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accurate market information, low commissions and the possibility of day trading, while the
more typical retail trader – e. g. an employee with moderate income who places his orders at
home after work for the next trading day – prefers a convenient and reliable transaction: For
those traders, convenience might be of greater importance than to get a price that is just one
tick better.
Best execution isn’t just relevant for securities traders: In a quote market there are dealers
who are obliged to submit quotes, i. e. bid and ask orders to the market. Their main profit
source is the spread, so dealers are commonly interested in maintaining a balanced position
throughout the trading day (O’Hara 1995, p. 51). In trading with informed traders, i. e. traders
with superior information about the assets fair value, dealers regularly suffer losses. So from a
dealers point of view, the requirements to best execution would be the quotation of indicative
offers instead of obligatory orders. Another mechanism to restrain informed trading might be
to design transparent markets, like the aforementioned possibility for liquidity traders to
12
disclose their identity to a dealer. Another point regards the losses market participants might
suffer by certain technological improvements that are intentionally introduced to improve
trading process and contribute to best execution. One of these issues is Nasdaq’s SOES (small
order execution system), that was introduced following the crash of 1987. It was intended to
give retail investors fast access to the market, particularly at times of stress. SOES had also
negative implications to the market because it enabled professional market participants (so
called SOES bandits) to identify and hit the stale quotes of other – so called SOESed – dealers
(Schwartz 1998, p. 144). From the SOESed dealer’s point of view this generates another
requirement to best execution: A mechanism, that automatically eliminates stale quotes from
the system.
Many other issues, concerning both traders and dealers, apply to the notion of best execution
when agency problems, like e. g. dual capacity trading and front running, are introduced.
We have shown that best execution is an indistinct matter: Each clientele has different
requirements towards best execution factors. This can be depicted with the Matrix of Best
Execution as shown in figure 2. On the horizontal axis we have drawn the different clienteles,
while the vertical axis represents various best execution factors. The shading of fields
indicates the relevance of a factor to a market participant: the darker the shade, the more
relevant the factor is to that particular investor. For instance, the factor fast execution is of
major relevance to a speculator, while the factor access to different markets is of medium
relevance to insurance companies. However, if a field is unshaded, this factor does provide
only little relevance (if any) to the specific group. An example might be the factor low
commissions, that doesn’t seem to play a role for fiscal agents.
insert figure 2 around here
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This figure, though, serves just as an illustration. It is far away of being a complete model.
We are aware that it is not a trivial matter to accurately identify 1) all the market participants,
2) the relevant factors and 3) to weight the factors according to an investors need as we have
done it. However, for the purpose of this paper – to propose how markets may be constructed
for the needs of different market participants – our presentation serves as a good
approximation of the real world.
1.3. Products and Best Execution
Now, lets make things more complex. Until now, we just spoke generally about securities
trading. In a next step, it is conceivable to introduce different products to the concept of best
execution. To an investor, the importance of a best execution factor varies regarding the
products traded. For instance, an arbitrageur has different requirements to the factor fast
execution when he trades blue chip stocks on the one hand or illiquid bonds on the other.
Just like for the different factors and their clientele, one can find many different categories
and subcategories of traded products; each of having different influences to the Matrix of Best
Execution. This leads to the introduction of a third dimension to the matrix: the dimension
Products, turning the rectangle into a cuboid. However, the aim of this paper is not to identify
these issues completely but to show how markets might be designed in such a manner that all
three Matrix’ dimensions are considered.
2. The Design of Best Execution Markets
The analysis of the previous section points out the ambiguities in the meaning of economic
best execution. Yet, we elaborate on the design of markets that allows investors to configure
individually the market according to what they assume to be best execution. As we
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demonstrate, this goal hinges upon the underlying market model. In this chapter, therefore, we
pick-up the issue of market models. In particular, we propose a specific type of market model
which we consider promising to approach our goal of best execution. In order to implement
this in practice, we suggest a procedure that is generally apt to stress customer orientation
throughout the process of market design.
2.1. Traditional Market Models
In literature the notion of a market model – often dubbed as market structure – has been
controversially discussed for a long time. The German Stock exchange, for instance, defines
the market model as “the mechanism of matching orders to trades in the exchange trading
system“ (Deutsche Börse 2000, p. 7). This narrow definition, however, refers only to
securities that are traded on stock exchanges and comprises neither the off-market securities
trading nor commodity trading as a whole.
A more comprehensive approach tends to the structural features of markets such as price
discovery, trading frequency etc. (see Gomber 2000, p. 10-11). Each of the features can have
several characteristics as figure 3 illustrates.iii
insert figure 3 around here
The market maker principle employed by the Nasdaq until 1997 is an example for one
possible characteristic of the feature ”price discovery“, whereas most of the Electronic
Communication Networks (ECN), e. g. Island, rely on continuous auctions (Island 2000).
Accordingly, the configuration of the structural features of the market determines the concrete
market model. However, these characteristics are not necessarily fixed over time. Recall that
trading on the NYSE actually involves two different trading mechanisms: A call auction is
15
used to open trading, whereas a continuous auction is applied until the end of the trading day
(O’Hara 1995, p. 10, 179). On the other hand there are cases where these characteristics are
not subject to change. This case, for instance, applied at the Nasdaq before the Order handling
rules (OHR) were introduced. Until then, only the market maker principle was employed:
dealers offered their quotes, traders hit them.iv (see Huang. and Stoll 1996, p. 318). From this
examples it becomes obvious that not only the combination of the characteristics but also an
additional determinant – the degree of the characteristic’s variability – is crucial for the




• dynamic market models.
A static market model denotes the case where exogenous factors (i. e. factors independent
from the market occurrences) determine the structural features’ characteristics (see Budimir
and Gomber 1999, p. 255). An example will be helpful for comprehension: Let’s take a look
at the feature ”price discovery“ at the aforementioned ECN Island. Here we have only one
characterization of the feature price discovery, that being a continuous double auction. The
trading rules – i. e. to implement just one price discovery mechanism – are set independent
from the events taking place on the market.
Beside this trivial case the classification of market models that facilitate a change of the
characteristics is more sophisticated. The NYSE provides a vivid example of a static market
model. The exogenous factor trading time determines the trading mechanism: At the
16
beginning of the trading day there is a call auction. After that, trading takes place using a
continuous auction.
A flexible market model denotes the case where endogenous factors – i. e. factors that are the
result of special market events – determine the characteristics of the market structure (see
Budimir and Gomber 1999, p. 256). The volatility interruption of the Xetrav system appears to
be an appropriate example. It occurs whenever the next execution price lies outside a
specified price range. As a consequence, continuous trading is instantaneously interrupted and
a call auction is initiated (Deutsche Börse 2000).
However, both static and flexible market models cannot meet the heterogeneous requirements
of all the different market participants. Applied to the case of securities markets, the ability to
fulfil investor’s needs is crucial for the success of both stock exchanges and ECNs,
respectively. Yet, stock exchanges have traditionally adopted either flexible or static market
models that are incapable of meeting all the investors demands. Their services usually
comprise transactions designed for the “medium investor“. The lack of flexibility is a major
reason why a variety of ECNs have emerged which seek to offer specific transaction services
for special nichesvi (see Gomber 2000, p. 58). This shortcoming of traditional market models
leads us to the third category, namely to dynamic market models.
2.2. Dynamic Market Models as a Solution
A dynamic market model denotes the case where market participants themselves choose
market structure’s characteristics for each transaction. This concept aims to provide the
market participants with a toolbox that enables them to select the most proper trading vehicle
according to their individual preferences (see Gomber 2000, p. 99). Schwartz uses a
resembling metaphor: “As with any shopping mall, the trader (customer), when entering the
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market, would select the specific modality (store) that best suits his or her needs, given the
size of the order, the trading characteristics of the stock, and that customer’s desire to trade
quickly or willingness to be patient“ (Schwartz 1998, p. 149). The multiple-platform market
structure proposed by the NYSE (NYSE 2000) exemplifies the concept of dynamic market
models:
According to the NYSE reportvii, the multiple-platform market structure offers investors two
mechanisms of price discovery. The investor can either select a floor based agency auction or
an automatic execution through an electronic trading system. The floor based agency auction
of the NYSE traditionally embodies a high concentration of liquidityviii due to the large
number of market participants. The investors on the NYSE floor are represented by the so-
called crowd, i. e. brokers that come to the post to seek an execution. The competition among
the crowd leads to an adequate price discovery. On the other hand, an automatic execution
especially takes the demand for execution speed into account. Both trading mechanisms and
market structures are left to fair competition but within the bounds of a single marketplace
(NYSE 2000, p. 11)ix. The dynamic market model approach, however, is even more far-
reaching, since it permits a tailor-made compilation of all features.
Overall, dynamic market models appear to be superior to traditional market models since they
allow the investors to choose the most benefiting trading vehicle according to their
preferences (see section 1). The choice of the structural features, however, implies that the
trading system has to verify the mutual interoperability of the chosen market models before
two corresponding orders can match.x The trade may take place only if their structural features
coincide. This market model clearly divides the market into several market segments. Each of
the market segments is distinguished by a different degree of market transparency, price
discovery etc. One might discern that this configuration will reduce the liquidity of the entire
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market: If, at one hand, we have a buyer who prefers a continuous double auction as price
discovery mechanism for his order and, at the other hand, there is a seller who prefers a call
auction, there will be no matching at all – even if all the other order parameters match.xi This
argument can be softened regarding the desire for alternative market models that finally led to
the evolvement of ECNs. Hence, the provision of a dynamic market model does not
additionally defragment the market. It rather concentrates distinct transaction orders in one
marketplace (see Gomber 2000, p. 159).
NYSE’s push forward suggesting a multiple-platform market model clearly breaks with the
tradition of static and flexible market models. Due to the dynamic market model’s immanent
advantages, the NYSE approach is considered promising.
A market that embodies a dynamic market model, however, still cannot provide the full range
of best execution demanded by the full range of investors. Nonetheless, such a market is in
the position to meet the diverse demands of a predetermined investor group and can be – in a
sense – upgraded in a successive manner.
The implementation of a dynamic market model from scratch is rather difficult. Different
market segments require the provision of different structural features. The selection of the
predetermined investor group thus has an impact on the adequate market model. To simplify
the designing process, we suggest to comply with the following procedure (see figure 4).
insert figure 4 around here
As a first step, the product selection divides the total market into market segments and thereby
reduces complexity. While the demands of all investors are multifaceted, partly even
inconsistent with each other, the demands of investors pertaining to the same market segment
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may have at least quasi-homogeneous demands. Secondly, the various market participants
have to be identified. In the subsequent step, surveys performed on the identified investor
groups yield the demands with respect to best execution. In this context the influence of
customs and practices on the demand must be recognized. Note that – after step 3 – we are
able to fill out a slice of the three-dimensional Matrix of Best Execution. In step 4, the design
of the structural attributes, mainly the price discovery mechanisms, has to be attuned to the
demands in order to achieve a high level of customer orientation. Finally, experimental tests
have to be performed in order to get feedback from the participants, whether best execution
transactions could be achieved or not. In each of the phases it is allowed to step back to a
prior one, to reconfigure or enhance the model.
The stated arguments presented in this chapter gave rise to the implementation of a trading
system which we introduce in the following chapter. Moreover, we briefly sketch the
designing process of the trading system exemplifying the suggested procedure.
3. The Implementation of a Dynamic Market Model
The prototype AMTRASxii (Agent Mediated Trading System) was developed as an Internet
trading system designated for institutional bond traders (see Weinhardt and Gomber 1999).
The project primarily aimed at developing a trading system that epitomizes a dynamic market
model as a proof of concept. The German bond market was considered valuable to investigate
because most of the bond trades in Germany are negotiated face-to-face via telephone.
Neither exchanges nor electronic bond trading systems like Xetra are utilized by the market
participants because the existing market structures do not satisfy their heterogeneous needs.
Market data supports this observation: Only 10% of the trades are conducted via exchanges,
the portion traded on electronic systems is even smaller (see Weinhardt and Gomber 1999,
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p. 1). Evidently, this phenomenon reveals weaknesses of electronic trading systems adopting
traditional market models. An attempt to establish a successful bond trading system must
particularly fulfil the needs of the most important investor group, namely the institutional
investors who prevail bond trading (step 2 from the market design process described in
chapter 2.2).
Within the scope of the research project a survey was performed on German institutional
investors in order to extract their requirements for this specific market (step 3). According to
the survey, best execution comprises the following sectionsxiii:
• Most of the institutional investors prefer anonymous trading utilities. This aspect favors
the innovative use of electronic trading systems.
• The authorization of a broker to execute trades always bears the risk of intermediation.
The broker can take advantage of the additional information gained by his appointment
infringing his authority. The avoidance of front-running is accordingly one urgent need of
institutional investors.
• Overall, the investors regard the degree of transparency to be extremely important. The
degree assuring best execution is though controversial.
• Analogous to the previous aspect the demand for immediacy of a transaction is
controversial. This controversy stems from the trade-off between immediacy and
transaction costsxiv.
• Liquidity clearly remains the central aspect of markets. However, liquidity is rather the
result of a market’s ability to satisfy the needs of the investors. The design of the market
model can at most indirectly influence the liquidity. Only if all the influenceable needs of
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the investors are met, order flow can be accrued by adding additional liquidity to the
marketxv.
The results of the survey yield beside homogeneous requirements for the dedicated investor
group also heterogeneous requirements amongst them for an electronic bond trading system.
This obviously requires the application of alternative trading vehicles. At this point, we desist
from the description of the fourth stepxvi in favor of depicting the system.
Within the fifth step, the system is implemented. Since it is impossible to recognize all the
effects the new trading system might have to the market – for instance the possibility to hit
stale quotes with the SOES introduction at the Nasdaq –, it is advisable to use the techniques
of experimental economics to perform laboratory tests before its final release. The major
challenge within this step is to find an appropriate experimental design, one that depicts the
real-world as good as possible within the realms of the experimental environment. The
findings of the experimental tests can be used to improve the system as well as to supply new
insights to the other steps in the market design process.
The system AMTRAS has the capability of meeting investors‘ heterogeneous requirements.
As aforementioned, a dynamic market model forms the core of the system. The trader can
individually configure the structural feature’s characteristics degree of market transparency,
price discovery mechanism and degree of order obligation. This explicitly takes the investor’s
contradictory requirements into account. The selection of the desired market model hence
grants the flexibility which is comparable with the flexibility in the existing off-exchange
markets (see Gomber 2000, p. 158).
The electronic trading process implemented in AMTRAS is represented by a
multidimensional negotiation protocol and quite differs from the currently existing electronic
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trading systems. The negotiation sequentially pursues three distinct stages. All stages together
determine the terms of the transaction.
The trader initiates the first stage – the so-called product matching – by submitting his order
specification. A special feature of the AMTRAS system is the possibility of fuzzy order
specification in order to leave room for the negotiating (see Weinhardt and Gomber 1999,
p. 4). This stresses the integrative character of the negotiation protocolxvii. At this stage the
system starts searching for a corresponding order.
On success (i. e. when a matching product is found) the partner matching – the second stage –
is triggered. This stage accounts for the counterparty risk that particularly aggravates off-
exchange trades. The absence of a market surveillance always bears the risk that one party
fails to meet it’s obligations. In AMTRAS this issue is addressed in such a manner that a
trader may explicitly rule out to negotiate with certain other traders he individually
determined during order specification. For example, a trader might specify to contract only
with domestic partners, or with an élite he always does business with. By doing so the
counterparty risk is not completely eliminated but to a certain extent alleviated (see Edwards,
1995). Note that the order of performing steps one and two is not crucial; the same result
would have been accomplished if the system first identified the relevant partners, in order to
perform a product search in stage two. This is why the first two stages are depicted as they are
in figure 5.
insert figure 5 around here
After successful partner matching, subsequent stage encompasses the price discovery. At
present, AMTRAS supports four distinct mechanisms, as figure 5 illustrates. These are
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• manual price discovery, meaning that after a successful product- and partner matching
phase a trader gets notified by the system in such a way that she gets a list of potential
trading partners and corresponding products. Now, she can call her counterpart on the
phone to conduct further negotiations conventionally.
• bi- or multilateral bargaining, that being the possibility of electronically supported
interactive bargaining between trading partners. In AMTRAS, there is a possibility to
bargain both via an integrated chat system and a graphical user interface that depicts a
partner’s trading strategy (see Gomber 2000, p. 155-158).
• AMTRAS auction, i. e. a sort of single-sided Vickrey auction that was tailor-made for the
needs of institutional bond market participants. It should grant efficiency in that sense that
every investor will offer according to her real preferencesxviii.
• combined, meaning that the three aforementioned price discovery mechanisms can be
combined in order to minimize fragmentation effects.
As we previously stated, the needs of the traders may be heterogeneous. The dynamic market
model provides various price mechanisms being apt to guarantee best execution individually.
The depicted multidimensional negotiation is realized by the use of software agentsxix.
Software agents adopt the preferences and strategies of their human counterparts and pursue
them on behalf of the trader in an appropriate manner. This feature eliminates the risk of
front-running because the software agent’s goals should always be in accordance with the
principal’s. Moreover, the interposition of agents conforms with the demand for anonymity
(see Weinhardt, Gomber and Holtmann 2000, p. 830).
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4. Conclusion
In this article we present an approach to more customer orientation in (financial) market
design. We introduce the best execution matrix illustrating the complexity in designing
markets when heterogeneous demands concerning the best execution factors are given
through different investor groups.
The idea of dynamic market models is illustrated giving the opportunity to combine
heterogeneous structural features into one market structure allowing an individual compilation
of factors by each investor. Dynamic market models thereby increase customer orientation
and the possibility to achieve best execution transactions by providing a toolbox to the
investors. We suggest a five step approach in creating customer oriented market designs.
Therefore, the brief description of the first five steps of the process towards a best execution
market design for the German bond trading market (AMTRAS) is used to point out our before
mentioned statements using innovative price discovery mechanisms, i. e. the possibility of bi-
and multilateral negotiations that could be delegated to software agents.
Current and future research targets mainly the following aspects:
i. We are currently designing and performing experimental tests with the AMTRAS
system (phase 5) to ensure customer satisfaction and to enhance system’s capabilities.
ii. Additionally, we are widening our existing approach towards additional financial
products. Taking the growing relevance of private investors into account (see
Weinhardt and Gomber and Holtmann 2000, p. 826), we do focus on stock and bond
market designs, filling the structural features with innovative solutions.
iii. As we do not consider the before mentioned aspects regarding the design of best
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execution markets to be valid for financial markets exclusively, we are currently
moving ahead on the product dimension in our best execution matrix and are
transferring our approaches towards energy- (see Strecker 2000) and other kinds of
commodity markets.
As in current B2B (Business-to-Business) or B2C (Business-to-Customer) markets
respectively exchanges, market structures are static and the price discovery is reduced to quite
simple protocols – namely auctions (see e. g. Ströbel 1999), we do think that our concepts
have to be transferred to other than financial markets as well.
The transfer of financial markets’ approaches – targeting price discovery as well as market
microstructure theory at a whole – towards the trading of commodities of all kinds is
promising to overcome current limitations and to attain time-to-market and quality advantages
for innovative players in designing tomorrows markets. Actually players are recognizing the
lack of existing markets as they state:
“Hybrid models allow existing participants to connect and interact in even
more ways, providing the flexibility that real worlds markets demand and
spawning more transactions within the marketplace. Because each mechanism
attacks a different business inefficiency, the market that provides the full range
of trading mechanisms will most optimally serve its buying and selling
communities, as well as create complementary revenue streams for itself.“
(see IDAPTA 2000)
A lot of effort has to be made to transfer existing concepts and approaches to build financial




 According to Picot et. al., the transaction process consists of the phases information, order routing, price
discovery, clearing and settlement (see Picot et al. 1995).
ii
 While the commission for a small order (volume below 1,000 Euro [      
broker totals to about 25  !
 ""#
iii
 There are, of course, numerous structural features not shown in figure 3. However, our intention is just to
illustrate the concept. For a complete analysis see Gomber (2000).
iv
 In 1997, the Nasdaq implemented a hybrid market by adopting new OHR (SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-38110.txt). The limit order display rule requires a market maker to publicly
display a trader’s order if it is inside the spread. These orders can be executed without the interposition of a
market maker (Nasdaq, http://www.nasdaq.com/about/oh_rules.stm).
v
 The electronic trading system Xetra (Exchange Electronic Trading) was introduced in 1997 by the Deutsche
Börse. It's predecessor was the system IBIS (Integriertes Börsenhandels- und Informationssystem).
vi
 “Historically, a small investor would have to pay a penalty in terms of higher proportion of cost in order to get
a small trade executed on the New York Stock Exchange. Nowadays, however, the shift in technology means that
small order processing can be relatively profitable and the ECNs are reaping the reward“ (Langton 1999).
vii
 The NYSE has recognized that the technical development requires amendments concerning their market
structure in order to provide their customers the best executions in NYSE-listed stocks. The committee of public
directors of the NYSE, who has been appointed to analyze the NYSE market structure, governance and
ownership, motivates in their report the deployment of technological advances and regulatory changes as long as
they serve the Best Execution Principle (NYSE 2000, p. 14). At first, the inquiry of the market structure leads
among others to recommend the implementation of a multiple-platform market structure.
viii
 In this context liquidity refers to the ability of market participants to trade immediately at reasonable prices.
Liquidity spans the following dimensions: depth, breadth, resiliency (see Schwartz 1991, p. 127).
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ix
 According to the NYSE report the multiple-platform market structure generates a basis for continuous
adaptation where the outcome is uncertain (NYSE 2000, p. 19).
x
 Therefore new protocols or algorithms for matching have to be implemented; besides the trivial case of single-
item matching – like e. g. the price – successive or parallel multi-attribute matching has to be implemented (for
more information to the topic of electronic negotiations refer to http://enegotiations.wu-wien.ac.at/).
xi
 There are other structural features’ characteristics that are not that essential, e. g. anonymity. If one player
reveals his identity to the market while his trading partner does not, the order can still be executed.
xii
 The project was a joint venture of the Chair for Information Systems at the faculty of Economics, Giessen
University, Germany (http://www-wi.wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de) in association with the Deutsche Börse Group
(http://www.exchange.de), Compaq Germany (http://www.compaq.de) (formerly Digital Equipment) and the
German software company living systems, Donaueschingen (http://www.living-systems.com).
xiii
 A comprehensive description of the survey‘s results is given by Gomber (2000, p. 79-85).
xiv
 “However, higher direct costs (i. e. market impact, bid-ask spreads, commissions and other transaction costs)
are generally incurred when fast execution is obtained“ (Economides and Schwartz 1995, p. 24).
xv
 At this point we refer to a survey of the international Federation of Stock exchanges: “Often there is a ‚chicken
and egg‘ situation: i.e. if you look at liquidity and another quality factor it is hard to define what causes what.
Liquidity creates liquidity“(see Meier 1998, p. 13).
xvi
 Instead we refer to the article Weinhardt and Gomber (1999) for a detailed description.
xvii
 Negotiations are traditionally distinguished in either integrative or distributive types (see Walton and
McKersie, 1965). Distributive types denote “win-lose“ negotiations. One party can only gain at the other party‘s
expense. Integrative negotiations on the other hand denote “win-win“ negotiations. Kersten and Noronha
characterize this type of negotiation as follows: “The parties attempt to expand the pie during the negotiation
process“ (Kersten and Noronha, 1999).
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xviii
 Please refer to http://enegotiations.wu-wien.ac.at/ for a detailed description of negotiation protocols’
evaluation criteria.
xix
 Software agents are “computational systems that inhabit some complex dynamic environment, sense and act
autonomously in this environment, and by doing so realize a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed“
(Maes 1994, p. 135-162).
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Figure 3: Structural Features and their Characteristics
Structural Features Characteristics
price discovery auction market hybrid market dealer market
trading frequency continuous trading periodic (call) trading
degree of market
transparency open orderbook
display of best orders
x = { 1, 2, ... n } closed orderbook
obligation character





































































































Figure 5: AMTRAS’ Dynamic Market Model
Specification of the parameters by traders
Search process
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